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Proposals for Public
Land Reform
Sorting Out the Good, the Bad
and the Indifferent
Joseph L. Sax9

On August 1. 1995, the Subcommittee on National
Parks, Forests and Lands of the House Committee on
Resources held a hearing on Representative Jim Hansen's
bill, H.R. 2032,1 to offer to transfer the lands administered
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to the States in
which the lands are located. That bill itself, which contains
virtually no constraints on use. no limitations on sale to
private interests, no provisions for public access, and
which would allow resource-rich states to take lands with
billions of dollars of resource value, while leaving the federal taxpayer to manage the lands in other less fortunate
states, does not have much in the way of serious
prospects, even in the self-described -revolutionaryatmosphere that has pervaded the Congress, and especially the House in 1995.
Like the proposal associated with Interior Secretary
James Watt a dozen or so years ago. 2 which faded as western
subsidized resource users contemplated the prospects of
sales of BLM lands to profit-maximizing foreign investors
unlikely to continue subsidizing local commodity users of
the federal lands, the Hansen bill has taken a rapid downward slide in the political marketplace. It is only one of a
variety of bills in various stages in the Congress, including a
bill to establish a commission to look at decommissioning
4
national parks 3 a pervasive public land review commission,
and a proposal to sell off National Forest Service land on
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which as many as 137 skt resorts are located. 5
Shortly after the introduction of the Hansen
bill, Ted Stewart, Utah's Department of National
Resources director, told the Utah press that the
state could not afford to manage the BLM lands the
way the federal government would require under a
transfer. "[tlhe state could probably make an argument that it could manage the lands more effectively than the BLM-but only if the lands came free of
environmental 'encumbrances' and were allowed to
be managed for ...
develop[ment." 6 The reality he
said is that "Congress is never going to relinquish
BLM lands without promises from the states that
those lands will be protected," and "[ilf
the state
were to manage BLM lands in Utah under those
requirements, it would likely lose millions of dollars
annually."7 "State officials are so disinterested in
Hansen's proposal," the press reported, "that they
terminated a cost-benefit study ... "8
For all its obvious difficulties, and its repeated
failure to become reality, the dream of federal land
disposition to the western states (sometimes erroneously described as giving the western lands back
to the states) is remarkably persistent. When I went
back to read Bernard DeVoto's famous 1947 article,
The West Against Itself,9 Iwas not surprised to see the
parallels between his description of the sagebrush
agenda of a half century ago, and that which has
emerged in the 104th Congress of 1995 DeVoto
described a plan for "Idlistribution of all the Taylor
Act grazing lands...to the individual states as a preliminary to disposing of them by private sale."' 0 He
even noted a proposal to sell the Central Valley
Project to California, another idea that has returned
in similar form today."I
The message seems to be the familiar one that
nothing really changes, and that resource plunder is
a permanent theme of western land politics.
Certainly it is one element in the perennial publicland/states-rights debate. Maximizing the acreage
devoted to resource development, with minimal
regulation, is an enduring theme; and state ownership and management (often as a prelude to disposition) has routinely been thought the best route to
that end.
Without diminishing at all the importance of
5. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) (Budget
Reconciliation Act) (this provision was withdrawn by the leadership before the bill was sent to the President).
6. Jerry Spangler & Brent israelson, Utah Not So Eagerto Grab
BLM Land, DESERET NEws, Sept. 4, 1995, at Ai.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Bernard DeVoto, The West Against Itself, HAUER5, Jan. 1947.
at 231.
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that traditional theme, I would like to suggest that
there is also a new dimension to the public land
debate, and that the familiar elements in proposals
like the Hansen bill are only part of a much larger
drama that is being played out in the public policy
arena. The larger show is not just about resource
exploitation nor is it just about the public lands. It
extends to a variety of matters that have been put
on the agenda of the 104th Congress, beginning in
January of 1995: the battle over the Environmental
Protection Agency and its legislation, regulatory
reform, reauthorization of the Endangered Species
Act, controversy over wetlands regulation, and the
various legislative proposals proffered at the behest
2
of the property rights movement.t
The larger question is how we are to deal with
lands and waters that are simultaneously claimed
for competing purposes-both to serve developmental interests and to continue (or be restored) to
provide natural services, such as wildlife habitat.
Bluntly put, the question is what we are to do about
the tree that is at once wanted as lumber and as
essential habitat for nesting birds?
The issue has perhaps been most candidly
put by Senator Conrad Burns of Montana, who
has introduced a facially neutral bill to establish
a Commission to review and report on both
administrative and ownership changes for the
public lands.' 3 While the Burns bill advertises
itself as an objective look at the public lands, it
has a variety of elements that suggest it would
not be a replay of the serious, analytical effort of
the Public Land
Law Review Commission (PLLRC)
4
of the 1960s.1
For example, the Burns bill calls for proposed
implementing legislation to be put forward, which
need not be the draft proposed by the Commission,
and requires that bill to be put on a congressional
fast track, which would mean l'imited referral, discharge from congressional committee, prohibition
on amendment, and limitation on debate. The
model is that of military base closings, which was
devised to prevent congressional efforts to pick
favored local facilities and exempt them from the
base closing process. No such express ride through
Congress is appropriate for a national review of
10. Id.at 248.
II. Alex Barnum, Farmers Seek Control of Water Assets, SF.
CHRON., Aug. 4, 1995, at Al.

12. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) and S. 605, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
13. S. IS1, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
14.

ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND-A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMMISSION (1970).
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public land policy. By contrast the PLLRC report
was under consideration for half-a-dozen years
before legislation, in particular the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 15
finally evolved from it.
The composition of the Commission proposed
in the Bums bill,' 6 in contrast to the PLLRC, is
unlikely to be politically balanced. Six of its nine
members are to be appointed by Congress, and only
three by the President. Another indicator that the
Bums bill has a built-in agenda is that it already
incorporates a series of quite specific conclusions
that would ordinarily be put to a study commission
as items for consideration, such as a directive to
reduce administrative and management costs by
50%; a mandate about how land management plans
may be challenged (on site-specific actions, rather
than on the plan itself); and a directive describing
how the administrative appeals process is to work.
The PLLRC, by contrast, was given a broad, and
open-ended charge to provide "a comprehensive
review of [the public landl laws and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder and to determine whether and to what extent revisions thereof
7
are necessary."'
Perhaps the most significant fact about the
bill lies in the statement which Senator Bums
made in introducing it. He contrasted the recent
emphasis on environmental protection, conservation and nonconsumptive uses of the public lands
with earlier legislation that emphasized commodity production and development. Current public
land laws, he indicated, have upset the preexisting
balance of uses, and efforts to utilize the lands for
commodity purposes have been brought to a halt
in the face of demands that they be left to provide
more environmental benefits and services. He
said: "Instead of fulfilling a widely supported and
legally established goal of providing products and
services from our public lands under the reasonable requirements of sustained yield and multiple
use. we have natural resource management gridlock."18
I believe Senator Burns has identified the new
issue that has come to dominate conflict over public land policy. It is not simply profit-maximizing by
commodity users; nor is it a special love for state
government as somehow better or closer to the citizen, though both those issues continue to be present. What has changed is the presence of a new
and deeper conflict over the allocation of the public

lands to the competing demands made upon them.
That issue has become especially pointed in
recent years because the established way of dealing
with the problem is no longer sufficient to the task,
if it ever was. As to the public lands, for more than
a century-indeed from the very first days of the
withdrawal and reservation of federal forest, park,
and refuge land-the operative assumption has
been that different purposes and different needs
could be achieved by setting aside distinct
enclaves, each with its own stated purpose. The
unstated assumption of an enclave theory, however
is that since a particular interest or value has been
protected in one place that it need not be attended
to elsewhere. That is the view, for example, that
because wildlife is protected in a refuge or in a park.
other lands need not be managed for the maintenance of wildlife habitat.
Under enclave management, every interest has its
own space, often won at great expense of effort. The
crucial question under enclave management is where
the national park boundary is drawn, or whether land
shall be in a parkora national forest. But once the battle is over and the line drawn, the negative imperative
of such parcelization comes into play. What you have
not won for your categorical enclave is not mandated
to be managed for your purposes.
As long as the enclave approach dominated
public land policy, for the most part peace reigned.
To be sure, it was never a satisfactory approach from
an ecological point of view. The physical consequences of the enclave theory were visible, for
example, in forests cut right up to the park boundary. Similarly, a park official, until quite recently,
would not ordinarily think it appropriate to concern
himself with the planning process in an adjacent
national forest even though that planning might
involve activities such as oil and gas developments
that could or would affect park wildlife. Moreover,
there was no necessary relationship between
enclave boundaries and ecological goals, such as
preserving biological diversity.
The various legislative embodiments of multiple use nibbled at the edges of this approach, but
never fundamentally challenged or undercut it. For
the most part, the 1960 Multiple Use Sustained
Yield Act 9 only codified the preexisting reality, that
the national forests were not solely to be allocated
to commodity use (though they continued to be
used primarily for timber harvesting). The more
elaborate multiple use mandates of FLPMA20 and

15. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1994).

18. 141 Cong. Rec. S12242 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bums).

16. S. 115i. 104thCong.. Ist Sess. § 2 (1995).

19.16 U.SC. §§ 528-31 (1994).

17. Pub. L. No. 88-606. 78 Stat. 982 (1964).

20.43 U.S.C. f 1701-84.
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the National Forest Management Act in 197621 were
more environmentally sensitive, but they moved
away only slightly from the "discrete pieces"
approach that underlies enclave planning. To the
extent that there are issues of "critical environmental concern," FLPMA anticipates that distinct areas
shall be designated and set aside to be protected.
In the same rather laconic spirit, the statute provides that planning "shall provide for compliance
with applicable pollution control laws." 22 The
notion that critical environmental concerns may be
pervasive, rather than discrete, does not inform the
mid-1970s generation of public land legislation,
despite the fact that the Endangered Species Act
had been enacted several years earlier.23
Similarly, under the older approach, a sharp
line was drawn between private and public land,
and between federal and local/state government
areas of responsibility. The very notion of federal
land use law has been anathema to the Congress,
and even rather moderate efforts to craft national
park protection bills by some sort of compatibility
regulation of adjacent lands whose uses were
affecting parklands has been repeatedly rejected by
Congress as a form of unwanted federal zoning. 24 All
these elements of conventional policy reveal the
enclave mentality in its starkest form.
Several things might be observed about
enclaves, which helps to explain their appeal and
persistence as an approach. Like all "bright line"
rules and approaches, they make things clear. You
know where you stand, you know what you can do,
and what is none of your business. Moreover, you
have a clear sense of the physical scope of your victory or your defeat in the political arena. If you have
fought over adding 1.000 acres to a park, that 1,000
acres definitively measures your achievement.
On the other hand, just about everything about
enclaves is at odds with just about everything about
protecting natural systems. As we began to become
concerned about protection of natural systems, we
found ourselves with a dysfunctional federal land
infrastructure. We had in effect created a system of
rights and expectations that was poorly attuned to
our emerging goals. That is not to say that everything had worked as badly as possible, primarily
because a great deal of western land (whatever its
category) was largely undisturbed through most of
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. It hardly mattered that a park was surrounded by forests,

or even private land, so long as those nearby lands
were largely uncut, ungrazed and unmined, as many
were. Moreover, where enclaves were more or less
congruent with natural boundaries, such as a discrete river basin segment or landscape, they
allowed effective protection of a coherent part of a
natural system.
The first significant step away from enclave theory, though certainly not in any conscious way, was
what may be called overlay planning, as illustrated
by the Wilderness Act. 25 That law created a management prescription which could be laid over any sort
of designated federal land, regardless of its enclave
character-a park, a national forest, a BLM areaand then that place would be managed according to
wilderness principles.
The next step, again certainly not one that was
consciously taken, was habitat, formalized in the
critical habitat designation under the Endangered
Species Act. 26 Again, the format is overlay, but this
time the designation is driven by scientific data
rather than legislative line-drawing, and it can cover
public and private land. The habitat overlay trumps
not only previous enclave designations for federal
land management, but encompasses private as well
as public land. It fundamentally shifts attention
away from the enclave. Instead, it describes an area
for which a specified management prescription is
appropriate based on its natural qualities and possibilities, and it sets a management prescription
whose purpose is to maintain various natural
processes that are required to assure the viability
and recovery of protected species.
The meaning of these changes is that the central issue for the public land is no longer, as it once
was, whether a given place shall be open to mining
and grazing, or set aside as a refuge, or committed
to use as a ski resort. It is rather how to mediate
between the new sort of demands arising out of tension between what I have elsewhere called "the
economy of nature, "27 that is, a demand that land
provide natural services, such as habitat for birds or
bears, on the one hand, and the more traditional
demands such as commodity and recreational use,
the conventional developmental economy, on the
other. Not long ago, either the demands of the conventional economy alone had to be met (in a
national forest which was committed to timber harvesting, notwithstanding its declining population of
owls, for example), or it was assumed that while the

21. 16 U.S.C. § 1600-87.

25, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36.

22. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c).

26. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).

23. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (enacted Dec. 28, 1973).
24. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks
and the Regulation of Pnvate Lands, 75 MICH. L. REv. 239 (1976).

27. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Jature;
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAn. L,
REV. 1433. 1442-46 (1993).
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conventional economy could be served in the forest, the economy of nature in the form of the owls'
needs, would be met elsewhere, in some designated enclave. Similarly, one nver would be de-watered
to meet the needs of the conventional economy,
while it was assumed that others would meet the
needs of fishermen, and preserve aquatic species.
The significance of the change away from distinct enclaves as our management prescription for
the public lands can hardly be overstated. Once it is
accepted that preservation of natural processes is
not to be limited only to a discrete category of
.preservation" enclave lands, but is an obligation
borne by lands that have been in the developmental economy, some very important changes are necessarily going to take place. After all, the essence of
the developmental economy is to replace natural
processes and largely to terminate them: forests
and grasslands become farmland; indigenous mammals are replaced by grazing cattle and sheep.
aquatic systems are dried up and rivers become
sources of irrigation and drinking water. The economy of nature demands some level of reversal of that
process, yet without returning the lands to a preservation state and giving up their commodity and
developmental values.
What does all this say about the debate over
public land policy' It says that the old arrangements are not holding. The victories commodity
users won by having certain enclaves carved out
from preservation-type designations are no longer
insulated from the claims of the economy of nature.
Neither can interests rely on the managerial agencies to accommodate their needs. Because of the
intervention of courts, and the interpenetration of
mandates generated by environmental laws, agencies are no longer nearly as much the masters of the
lands they manage as they once were. The old politics may still govern some issues, as has been the
case with mining or grazing fees, but for many
issues that is distinctly no longer the case.
The new situation means that commodity users
are looking for new ways to unburden themselves
from the environmental obligations that are being
imposed on all the public lands. This search, in my
opinion, explains in large part why there has been a
resurgence of interest in various proposals for getting the public lands out of federal control. Ironically,
however, most of the proposals that have been put
fonvard would not achieve what their proponents
seek even if they were enacted as they stand.
The reason is that neither disposition of public
lands to the states, nor even sale by the states into
28. See. e.g., H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) and S.
768, 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995).
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private ownership, would lift the obligation of laws
like the Endangered Species Act. That law follows
the land anywhere and everywhere, whatever its
designation and whatever its ownership. Not surprisingly, bills to weaken the Endangered Species
Act have been prominent during the 104th
Congress. 28
Most careful observers. I am sure. believe that
no extreme is likely to prevail. The West will not be
returned to some pristine pre-European settlement
state. Nor are essentially all controls going to be
lifted off either public or private lands. No significant segment of the federal lands will be turned
over to the States, nor will they be sold off.
Observation suggests thata new and quite different
approach is coming into being to accommodate the
tensions between developmental and natural
demands, an informal approach that has thus far
not been codified in statute, but is likely to play a
dominant role in the next generation of public land
management.
The place to look for the shape of the emerging
future is to the settlements that have been hammered out in places like the Pacific Northwest in
response to the controversy over the spotted owl; in
the California Bay-Delta where a primary concern is
meeting dbwnstream water quality problems; and
in the Florida Everglades where the issue has been
restoration of historic water flows into southernmost Florida. These efforts, most of which have
been fashioned under Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt's leadership, are all still very much in the
early stages of life. All of them are fragile, and all
must be considered works in progress.
Despite their provisional status, I am confident
that they are the best indicators of where we are
going. They denote first and foremost that the
established structure of federal land planning and
management is fading in significance. In each of
these negotiated planning efforts, it matters less
and less that an area is designated as a national forest or as BLM land. or even as something as distinctive as the Oregon & California lands 2 9 What is
turning out to matter is that a workable deal can be
put together that accommodates the natural system
demands that drive the new planning process.
along with the economic and social needs of the
other communities that rely on the land-timber
companies, cities that need municipal water supply.
Indians who have traditional fishing claims, along
with commercial fishers, homebuilders, and so on.
In short, what is occurring is negotiated regional land use planning. In form it is federal planning,
29. Sm 43 U.S.C. § 181 (a).
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but as I think we shall see increasingly-and the
California Bay-Delta negotiation may be our most
revealing current model-success is likely to
depend on the ability to bring together federal and
state officials, as well as private owners and other
organizational and interest stakeholders. The
instructive archetype is the diplomatic negotiation
of an international agreement, with dominant coercive power a diminishing factor, and mutual interest
in "getting to yes." All this is a far cry from the
rhetoric of sagebrush rebels, or even the concerns
of Bernard DeVoto. But it is, I would submit, a central reality of land use in the 1990s. And if we can
get to a broadly acceptable agreement through
negotiation in the most sensitive regions and river
basins of the public lands, we will have achieved
about as much as we can expect of our institutions.
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